Files
warewulf/internal/pkg/clean/clean.go
jason scott f39c71f5c2 Adding mitigation for CWE-23 + verification test cases
Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Anderson <janderson@ciq.com>
2026-03-16 12:21:22 -06:00

86 lines
2.5 KiB
Go

package clean
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
warewulfconf "github.com/warewulf/warewulf/internal/pkg/config"
"github.com/warewulf/warewulf/internal/pkg/node"
"github.com/warewulf/warewulf/internal/pkg/util"
"github.com/warewulf/warewulf/internal/pkg/wwlog"
)
/*
Cleans up the OCI cache and remains of deleted nodes
*/
func CleanOciBlobCacheDir() error {
warewulfconf := warewulfconf.Get()
wwlog.Verbose("removing oci cache dir: %s", warewulfconf.Paths.OciBlobCachedir())
return os.RemoveAll(warewulfconf.Paths.OciBlobCachedir())
}
func CleanOverlays() error {
warewulfconf := warewulfconf.Get()
nodeDB, err := node.New()
if err != nil {
return err
}
nodes := nodeDB.ListAllNodes()
// Clean the base directory path FIRST
baseDir := filepath.Clean(warewulfconf.Paths.OverlayProvisiondir())
dirList, err := os.ReadDir(baseDir)
if err != nil {
return err
}
for _, item := range dirList {
if !item.IsDir() {
continue
}
if !util.InSlice(nodes, item.Name()) {
// Construct and validate the path (filepath.Join already calls Clean)
cleanTarget := filepath.Join(baseDir, item.Name())
// Compute the relative path to verify cleanTarget is within baseDir.
// This should never fail in normal operation since we just constructed cleanTarget
// using filepath.Join(baseDir, item.Name()). However, filepath.Rel() can fail in
// edge cases (different volumes on Windows, symlink anomalies, filesystem corruption).
// If we cannot determine the path relationship, we cannot safely validate whether
// deletion would stay within bounds, so we fail-secure and return an error.
rel, err := filepath.Rel(baseDir, cleanTarget)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"failed to compute relative path for '%s' with overlay working directory '%s': %w",
item.Name(),
baseDir,
err,
)
}
// Check for actual parent directory traversal (CWE-23 mitigation)
// This catches paths that escape baseDir like ".." or "../etc/passwd"
// but allows legitimate directory names like "..suspicious" or "...triple"
// which remain inside baseDir despite starting with dots.
if rel == ".." || strings.HasPrefix(rel, ".."+string(os.PathSeparator)) {
return fmt.Errorf(
"'%s' is not inside of overlay working directory: %s",
item.Name(),
baseDir,
)
}
wwlog.Verbose("removing overlays of deleted node: %s", item.Name())
err = os.RemoveAll(cleanTarget)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
return nil
}